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Abstract 
 
The Supreme Court decided in Padilla v. Kentucky that noncitizens in criminal 
proceedings have a Sixth Amendment right to advice on the immigration 
consequences of a guilty plea. Despite the promise of Padilla, many noncitizens with 
unconstitutional criminal convictions find themselves without a remedy. Discovering 
the adverse immigration consequences of their convictions only once they face removal 
in federal immigration proceedings, noncitizens are faced with strict temporal and 
custodial requirements that foreclose state avenues for Padilla relief. While the states 
can partially alleviate the ineffective assistance of Padilla by creating new criminal 
procedural rules to raise Padilla claims in state forums, a uniform federal solution is 
needed. Federal courts should interpret the definition of “conviction” under the INA 
to exclude convictions entered without effective crimmigration counsel. Congress did 
not intend for convictions entered without procedural safeguards guaranteed by the 
Constitution to make noncitizens removable. Furthermore, immigration judges can 
use their expertise in immigration law to the advantage of all parties by hearing 
Padilla claims in a federal forum. Sharing the burden of redressing Padilla violations 
between the federal and state forums will ultimately improve the implementation of 
crimmigration counsel and remedy the current ineffective assistance of Padilla. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In a 2010 landmark decision, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth 
Amendment requirement of providing effective assistance of counsel to 
criminal defendants includes the right to advice on the immigration 
consequences of a guilty plea.1 According to Padilla v. Kentucky, a guilty plea 
 
1 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010). 
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is constitutionally defective if a noncitizen is not informed that the 
underlying conviction will make him or her removable from the United States 
under federal immigration law.2 
Despite the promise of Padilla, for many noncitizens with legitimate 
claims for ineffective assistance of counsel, relief has remained elusive. 
Especially for noncitizens who accept pleas with short or noncustodial 
sentences, the impact of Padilla is often a right without a remedy.3 
The mismatch between the right announced in Padilla and the remedy has 
several causes. First, noncitizens who are not adequately informed of the 
immigration consequences of their guilty pleas often only become aware of this 
constitutional defect when they are subject to removal proceedings in federal 
immigration court. By this point, not only is there no right to court-appointed 
counsel in immigration proceedings, but also many of the state remedies for 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims are closed due to timeliness and 
custodial limitations. Second, there is no mechanism to challenge the criminal 
conviction in immigration courts. A noncitizen is forced to navigate both 
federal immigration proceedings and state criminal procedures 
simultaneously, often without counsel. Finally, some noncitizens never have 
access to a form of relief under Padilla to begin with. For example, a 
noncitizen whose plea includes participation in a diversion program that is 
not a conviction for state law purposes cannot vacate the conviction in state 
courts, but he or she can still be removed if the conviction meets the definition 
of conviction under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).4 
One potential solution to the ineffective assistance of Padilla is for states 
to implement a remedy. States have the ability to create tailored state criminal 
procedural rules to provide noncitizens with a remedy for Padilla violations.5 
However, given the lack of momentum to pass such laws and disagreement 
about the proper forum to provide Padilla relief, a federal remedy is the 
preferable option. The right of a noncitizen with an unconstitutional criminal 
conviction to remain in the United States should not depend on which state 
entered the conviction. A uniform federal remedy is needed to address the 
ineffective assistance of Padilla. 
Federal courts should interpret the definition of “conviction” under the 
INA to include only convictions supported by adequate procedural 
safeguards. If a conviction is the result of procedures so deficient that 
Congress would not have intended to make the noncitizen removable, the 
conviction cannot serve as the basis for removal. Convictions entered in 
 
2 Id. 
3 See infra Section IV.C. 
4 See infra Section IV.C. 
5 See infra Section V.C. 
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violation of Padilla—where noncitizens were not provided effective assistance 
of counsel as required by the Sixth Amendment—fall squarely within this 
category of convictions. Such a reading would require the government either 
to prove that the minimal constitutional protections were afforded to the 
noncitizen in the convicting jurisdiction before relying on the conviction in 
the immigration courts, or to allow the noncitizen to litigate a Padilla claim 
in the federal forum.6 The federal immigration courts should share the burden 
of implementing Padilla by ensuring that only constitutionally valid 
convictions lead to immigration consequences. In turn, states that are 
concerned with having state criminal convictions questioned in a federal 
forum will be incentivized to effectuate the guarantees of Padilla and provide 
a remedy for when the right is not met. 
Of course, Congress could intervene at any point to amend the definition 
of “conviction” under the INA and clarify how convictions in violation of 
Padilla should be treated. Christopher Lasch proposes a rule to address “the 
disparity between Padilla’s decision rule and its constitutional operative 
proposition.”7 Whereas Lasch provides a conceptual discussion of the 
constitutional right to crimmigration counsel announced in Padilla and 
proposes a rule to uphold these values, this Comment discusses Padilla in 
practice, outlining the meager current landscape of Padilla remedies and 
suggesting a federal solution based on statutory interpretation. Building on 
Lasch’s insights about the advantages of providing Padilla relief in a federal 
forum, I will suggest how and why the federal courts should adopt the 
suggested interpretation of “conviction” under the INA in the absence of 
congressional intervention to implement Padilla. 
Finally, a note about language and terminology: the INA refers to 
noncitizens as “aliens,” which for many elicits the notion of “illegal aliens.” 
Many immigrant communities understandably find references to the 
undocumented population as “illegal aliens” offensive. Additionally, use of 
the term “alien” under the INA can cause confusion because the statutory 
term includes all noncitizens and not just those who entered illegally: legal 
immigrants, nonimmigrant visitors on tourist visas, refugees, legal permanent 
residents (LPR), etc. To avoid offense or confusion, I will use the term 
 
6 See infra Section VII.B. 
7 Christopher N. Lasch, “Crimmigration” and the Right to Counsel at the Border Between Civil and 
Criminal Proceedings, 99 IOWA L. REV. 2131, 2156 (2014). Lasch proposes a rule, presumably to be 
adopted by Congress as an amendment to the INA, that would place the burden of proving the 
validity of criminal convictions resulting from guilty pleas on the government. Id. at 1256-57. The 
rule would require the government to prove that the subject of removal proceedings was represented 
by counsel during the criminal proceedings, and either that the noncitizen was able to have a Padilla 
claim heard on the merits in state courts, or, if unable to present a Padilla claim in state courts, to 
provide counsel for the noncitizen to litigate a Padilla claim in immigration court. Id. 
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“noncitizen” in place of alien. References to noncitizens are broadly construed 
to include legal permanent residents, visa holders, entrants without inspection, 
those who have overstayed nonimmigrant visas, asylum seekers, and refugees. 
When relevant, I will refer to a subset of noncitizens by a more specific term, 
such as “nonimmigrant visa holder” or “legal permanent resident.” 
I. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS AND 
IMMIGRATION PROCEEDINGS 
Federal immigration enforcement has a complex, interwoven relationship 
with criminal law, much of which is legislated and enforced on the state level. 
“Crimmigration” refers to the convergence of criminal law and procedure 
with immigration law, which since its inception has been considered a branch 
of civil law.8 Removal of noncitizens for criminal offenses has long been a part 
of the federal immigration scheme.9 In recent years, removals of noncitizens 
with criminal records have come to dominate immigration court dockets.10 
Removal proceedings are fully adversarial civil hearings.11 An 
immigration judge presides over the hearing and a government official acts as 
the adversary to the noncitizen, who has the right to be represented by 
counsel at his own expense but no right to court-appointed counsel.12 The 
noncitizen has the right to present evidence, give testimony, call witnesses, 
and cross examine government witnesses, although the noncitizen may not 
have the right to access secret government evidence for national security 
reasons.13 The rules of evidence do not apply, meaning hearsay and 
unauthenticated documents are generally admissible.14 
 
8 See Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. 
U. L. REV. 367, 376 (2006) (introducing the phrase “crimmigration” to describe the intersection of 
criminal and immigration law); see also Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893) 
(holding that deportation and removal are not criminal punishments). 
9 See KEVIN R. JOHNSON ET AL., UNDERSTANDING IMMIGRATION LAW 310 (2009) 
(describing the first comprehensive immigration law in 1882 that excluded “undesirable categories 
of noncitizens, including convicts”). 
10 See, e.g., CESAR CUAUHTEMOC GARCIA HERNANDEZ, CRIMMIGRATION LAW 8 (2015) 
(reporting that in 2013, ICE removed 216,810 people with criminal convictions on their records); 
Lasch, supra note 7, at 2132 (noting “the explosion, particularly since 1996, in the use of criminal 
convictions as a ground for deportation”). 
11 See JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 9, at 334-44 (providing a detailed overview of the removal 
process, including the substantive and procedural aspects of a removal hearing); see also MLive 
Media Group, What an Immigration Court Generally Looks Like, YOUTUBE (Dec. 11, 2017), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GIVfJpdbXP0 [https://perma.cc/9EM6-ZPPG] (providing a 
visual of the typical immigration court). 
12 JOHNSON ET AL, supra note 9, at 338. 
13 Id. at 341-43. 
14 Id. at 342. 
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Proceedings begin when the noncitizen is served with the charging 
document, known as the Notice to Appear (NTA).15 The NTA may be served 
by mail or in person.16 In the case of removals for criminal violations—the 
general topic of this Comment—the NTA may also be accompanied by an arrest 
warrant and the noncitizen may be detained—or in the case of certain criminal 
convictions must be detained—for the duration of the removal proceedings.17 
While the INA has been compared to the federal tax code in its 
complexity,18 I will attempt to provide a brief explanation of removals for 
criminal convictions under federal immigration law. For the purposes of this 
Comment, the discussion will be limited to offenses committed by 
noncitizens in the United States that render the noncitizen removable. 
A. Comparing Inadmissibility and Deportability 
While removal is colloquially referred to as “deportation,” noncitizens 
may actually be removed from the United States for criminal convictions 
under two distinct categories of the INA: 1) offenses that render the person 
inadmissible; and 2) offenses that render the person deportable.19 
Inadmissibility grounds apply to those who are attempting to enter or are 
present in the United States but have not made a lawful entry.20 For example, 
both noncitizens arriving at the border and noncitizens who entered without 
inspection and are residing in the United States without legal status may be 
ruled inadmissible and removed. Noncitizens might enter the United States 
without inspection and live in the country for decades, but they will be 
subjected to the same grounds for removal as if they were just arriving at a 
border inspection point.21 Deportation, on the other hand, refers to the 
removal from the United States of noncitizens who were lawfully admitted, 
including those who overstay a lawful admission pursuant to a nonimmigrant 
 
15 Id. at 334. 
16 Id. 
17 See id. at 335-37 (describing the expansion of immigration detention as an enforcement tool, 
and the serious consequences of detention such as separation from friends and family, inability to work, 
exposure to harsh detention conditions, and the difficulty of retaining and contacting an attorney). 
18 See ELIZABETH HULL, WITHOUT JUSTICE FOR ALL 107 (1985) (“The immigration laws 
are second only to the Internal Revenue Code in complexity.”). 
19 See THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, DAVID A. MARTIN, HIROSHI MOTOMURA, 
MARYELLEN FULLERTON & JULIET P. STUMPF, IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS 
AND POLICY 555-56 (8th ed. 2016) (distinguishing between deportability grounds and 
inadmissibility grounds as justifications for removal). 
20 Id. at 556. 
21 This is a vital distinction, because the grounds for inadmissibility are generally broader and thus 
easier to trigger. Id. at 556-57. Additionally, even long-term legal residents of the United States may be 
deemed inadmissible if they leave the United States and attempt to reenter under certain conditions, 
such as returning after more than six months abroad, attempting to reenter without inspection, or 
reentering after committing certain crimes either in the United States or abroad. Id. at 556. 
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visa.22 The INA provides for the deportation of noncitizens for a variety of 
conduct, including the focus of this Comment: criminal convictions. 
While inadmissibility and deportability are distinct concepts covered by 
different sections of the INA, the two are also closely linked. Any noncitizen 
who was inadmissible at the time of entry—for example a person who is 
erroneously admitted on a tourist or other nonimmigrant visa despite having 
disqualifying criminal convictions—is deportable under INA 
§ 1227(a)(1)(A).23 Additionally, both the inadmissibility and deportability 
sections of the INA have portions dedicated to removal for criminal 
convictions.24 Because removals under both inadmissibility and deportability 
grounds for criminal convictions turn on shared definitions of criminal 
behavior, Sections I.B–D will focus on how three key categories of criminal 
behavior are defined: aggravated felonies, crimes involving moral turpitude, 
and controlled substance violations.25 Where relevant, each subsection will 
identify how the inadmissibility and deportability grounds differ in their 
treatment of the relevant category of offense. 
B. Aggravated Felonies 
Noncitizens convicted of aggravated felonies are deportable under INA 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).26 Aggravated felony has a specific statutory definition in 
the INA and does not depend on state law classification as a felony.27 The 
INA includes twenty-two crimes in the statutory definition of aggravated 
felony, including, but not limited to: murder, rape, sexual abuse of minor, 
firearms trafficking, “crime of violence. . .for which the term of imprisonment 
[is] at least one year,” theft offense punishable over one year, alien smuggling, 
 
22 See id. (“Deportability grounds apply only after a noncitizen has been admitted.”). 
23 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2012). 
24 Id. §§ 1182(a)(2), 1227(a)(2). 
25 Discussing only three categories of criminal offenses that render a noncitizen removable is 
inevitably an oversimplification. Congress has also criminalized other behaviors for the purposes of 
immigration control, such as immigration document fraud (8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(3)(C)) and entering 
the United States without inspection (8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)), both of which can render a 
noncitizen removable. However, the focus of this Comment is removal for the specific criminal 
behaviors described in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) and § 1227(a)(2). 
26 The inadmissibility portion of the INA does not mention aggravated felonies by name, but 
it does preclude anyone with a conviction for an aggravated felony from accessing a discretionary 
waiver of criminal inadmissibility grounds that might otherwise allow a noncitizen to enter or 
remain despite criminal convictions. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). Additionally, while the offenses are not 
required to meet the definition of an aggravated felony, a noncitizen who commits two or more 
offenses, in a single or multiple trials, with an aggregate penalty of five years or more, is inadmissible. 
Id. § 1182(a)(2)(B). 
27 See Guerrero-Perez v. INS, 242 F.3d 727, 737 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that the term 
“aggravated felony” can include crimes classified as misdemeanors under state law). 
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and fraud or deceit over $10,000.28 On the one hand, it is not surprising to 
hear that serious crimes such as murder and sexual assault are removable 
offenses. However, crimes of violence and theft offenses punishable over one 
year encompass a wide range of offenses, some of which may be categorized 
as misdemeanors under state law.29 The definition of aggravated felony 
applies retroactively and has no temporal limit, meaning a years-old crime 
that was not defined as an aggravated felony under the INA at the time of 
commission or sentencing can still render a noncitizen deportable today or in 
the future if the definition of aggravated felony continues to expand.30 
C. Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude 
A second broad category of removable offenses is for crimes involving 
moral turpitude (CIMT). A noncitizen is inadmissible for committing a 
CIMT, with two exceptions if the person committed only one CIMT: 1) 
persons under eighteen at the time of commission if five years have passed 
since release; and 2) if the maximum penalty was under one year and the 
person was not sentenced to more than six months, regardless of time actually 
served.31 Noncitizens are deportable if convicted of a CIMT within five years 
of admission, but only if a sentence over one year could be imposed.32 
Additionally, convictions for multiple CIMTs, not arising out of the same 
incident, render a noncitizen deportable at any time after admission.33 
Crime involving moral turpitude is a term of art, defined by case law.34 
Black’s Law Dictionary offers a vague, unenlightening definition: “[A]n act 
of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which man 
owes to his fellow man, or to society.”35 One way to determine if a crime 
 
28 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2012) (defining “aggravated felony”). 
29 See GARCIA HERNANDEZ, supra note 10, at 42 (noting that the definition of aggravated 
felony is “sufficiently broad to include many misdemeanors,” including “crimes that would not strike 
many people as especially aggravated—small-dollar theft offenses, for example.”). 
30 See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594 (1952) (explaining that, because 
immigration law is civil and not criminal, the ex post facto clause banning retroactive penalization 
of conduct does not apply); Morris v. Holder, 676 F.3d 309, 312 (2d Cir. 2012) (striking down ex 
post facto challenge to expanding the definition of “aggravated felony”). The lack of ex post facto 
protection in some cases may render effective crimmigration counsel illusory. Criminal defense 
counsel can clearly explain the current immigration consequences of a plea deal but cannot predict 
future changes to the definition of aggravated felonies or the addition of more crimes as removable 
offenses to the INA. While not addressed in this Comment, the injustice of this scheme is a topic 
deserving of further treatment. 
31 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)–(ii) (2012). 
32 Id. §§ 1227 (a)(2)(A)(i)(I)–(II). 
33 Id. § 1227 (a)(2)(A)(ii). 
34 See JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 9, at 317 (explaining that moral turpitude has never been 
defined by the legislature for immigration purposes). 
35 Moral Turpitude, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990). 
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“involved moral turpitude” is to compare the crime to others the court “[has] 
previously deemed morally turpitudinous.”36 Generally, serious crimes 
against the person (e.g., murder, rape, aggravated assault); serious property 
crimes (e.g., arson, burglary, embezzlement); and crimes with an element of 
fraud have been deemed CIMTs.37 
D. Controlled Substance Offenses 
The INA is particularly unforgiving when it comes to controlled 
substance offenses.38 A noncitizen is inadmissible after being convicted of or 
admitting to the commission of any controlled substance violation.39 A 
noncitizen is likewise deportable after a conviction for a controlled substance 
violation, with the lone exception of a single offense for possession of thirty 
grams or less of marijuana for personal use.40 Neither section carries a sentence 
limit or temporal restriction on removal. This means that a noncitizen 
convicted of a single possession offense is removable for the rest of his or her 
life, or until the INA is amended, regardless of the sentence imposed. 
E. Denials of Relief from Removal 
Beyond rendering a noncitizen removable, a criminal conviction can also 
result in the denial of certain forms of relief from removal that might 
otherwise allow noncitizens to remain in the United States and apply for legal 
permanent residency or to depart voluntarily with reduced penalties.41 Under 
§ 1229c of the INA, the government or an immigration judge can allow a 
noncitizen in removal proceedings to depart voluntarily before proceedings 
begin or at the conclusion of proceedings without a removal order.42 Voluntary 
departure is beneficial to noncitizens because it allows them to avoid long 
periods of detention, to select the country of return, and most importantly to 
avoid bars on reentering the United States applied to noncitizens who depart 
 
36 Nunez v. Holder, 594 F.3d 1124, 1131 (9th Cir. 2010). 
37 See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 19, at 680 (exploring crimes that fall within the 
“maddeningly vague” category of moral turpitude). 
38 Controlled substances are defined by federal law. The Controlled Substance Act (CSA) 
classifies substances in “schedules” and includes most drugs that are also regulated under state law: 
marijuana, heroin, methamphetamines, cocaine, anabolic steroids, and some types of opioids. See 
GARCIA HERNANDEZ, supra note 10, at 53 (outlining which drugs correspond to each schedule). 
States are free, however, to regulate and criminalize drugs not listed in the CSA, which can create 
some discrepancy between controlled substance offenses under state law and those that constitute 
deportable offenses under the INA. Id. at 53-54. 
39 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) (2012). 
40 Id. § 1227(a)(2)(B). 
41 GARCIA HERNANDEZ, supra note 10, at 42. 
42 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229c (2012) (outlining scenarios in which voluntary departure is permitted). 
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under removal orders.43 However, voluntary departure is not available to any 
immigrant convicted of an aggravated felony.44 
The most generous form of relief from removal is cancellation of removal.45 
Cancellation of removal is a discretionary option whereby a noncitizen subject 
to removal who meets certain criteria—including lengthy residence 
requirements, good moral character, and extreme hardship to a citizen or Legal 
Permanent Resident (LPR) immediate relative in the United States—is 
allowed to remain in the United States and is conferred Legal Permanent 
Residency rather than removed.46 Cancellation of removal is not available to 
LPRs with aggravated felony convictions.47 A non-LPR does not qualify for 
cancellation of removal if he or she is inadmissible or deportable for any of the 
criminal grounds discussed above: aggravated felonies, CIMTs, or controlled 
substance violations, as well as falsification of travel documents.48 
The availability of relief from removal can shift incentives at the plea-
bargaining stage. For example, effective crimmigration counsel could seek a 
plea to a lesser offense that does not qualify as an aggravated felony if the 
noncitizen might qualify for cancellation of removal. Even if the guilty plea 
might still make the noncitizen deportable—for example, a controlled 
substance violation—effective crimmigration counsel might negotiate a plea 
to an offense that is not also an aggravated felony so that the client remains 
eligible for relief from removal. 
F. Defining Convictions for Immigration Purposes 
Like many concepts borrowed from criminal law and procedure, conviction 
also has its own definition and meaning for purposes of the INA and 
immigration law. For immigration purposes, a conviction is defined as follows: 
[A] formal judgment of guilt of the alien entered by a court or, if adjudication 
of guilt has been withheld, where— 
i) a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or the alien has entered a plea of guilty 
or nolo contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt, and 
ii) the judge has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on 
the alien’s liberty to be imposed.49 
 
43 See JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 9, at 330-31 (discussing the potential benefits of 
voluntary departure). 
44 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a)–(b) (2012). 
45 GARCIA HERNANDEZ, supra note 10, at 67. 
46 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (2012). 
47 Id. § 1229b(a)(3). 
48 Id. § 1229b(b)(1)(C). 
49 Id. § 1101(a)(48)(A). 
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Compared to many state definitions, this is extremely broad.50 Deferred 
adjudications, suspended sentences, and some diversion programs that would 
be considered favorable terms in a plea bargain might still render a noncitizen 
removable.51 In the context of providing effective crimmigration counsel, the 
differences between what constitutes a conviction under state law and 
immigration law are enormously important.52 For example, advising a 
noncitizen that a particular guilty plea is favorable because he will not be 
convicted under state law, without clarifying that the disposition is still a 
conviction for immigration purposes, can easily lead a noncitizen to 
unwittingly become deportable. 
II. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
The focus of this Comment is on remedying claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel by noncitizens who are inadequately counseled about 
the immigration consequences of plea bargains. The Sixth Amendment 
requires that a criminal defendant be afforded competent or effective 
assistance of counsel.53 Strickland v. Washington provides a two-pronged test 
to determine whether an attorney’s representation meets the Sixth 
Amendment standard.54 The first part, known as the “performance prong,” 
provides that counsel’s representation must not “f[a]ll below an objective 
standard of reasonableness.”55 Objective reasonableness can be judged against 
prevailing professional norms.56 The second prong, known as the “prejudice 
prong,” requires a reasonable probability that the deficient performance 
affected the result.57 The prejudice prong is a causation test of sorts, requiring 
that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”58 
Applying the Strickland test, effective assistance of counsel includes the 
right to an attorney’s adequate representation during plea bargaining.59 In 
 
50 See GARCIA HERNANDEZ, supra note 10, at 197 (explaining that “discrepancies in how states 
define a conviction and what constitutes a conviction for immigration law purposes” can make even 
a favorable state criminal case outcome a removable offense). 
51 Id. 
52 See infra subsection IV.B.1. 
53 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (“First, the defendant must show 
that counsel’s performance was deficient. . . . Second, the defendant must show that the deficient 
performance prejudiced the defense.”). 
54 Id. at 687-92. 
55 Id. at 688. 
56 Id. at 688-90. 
57 Id. at 694. 
58 Id. 
59 See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985) (extending the Strickland test from capital 
sentencing proceedings to the plea process). 
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cases challenging counsel’s performance during plea-bargaining, the 
performance prong is essentially the same: counsel must act in an objectively 
reasonable manner, judged against prevailing professional norms.60 To 
measure whether the defendant was prejudiced, the defendant must prove 
that but for counsel’s errors, he or she would not have pled guilty and would 
have instead insisted on going to trial.61 Whether or not the defendant would 
have prevailed at trial or gotten a more favorable outcome, the result of the 
proceeding was affected because the defendant would have proceeded to trial 
but for the constitutionally inadequate performance of the attorney. 
III. PADILLA: INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FOR FAILURE 
TO ADVISE ON IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES 
Padilla is a landmark case applying the ineffective assistance of counsel 
jurisprudence to noncitizens in criminal proceedings and holding that the 
failure to advise a noncitizen on the immigration consequences of a guilty 
plea is constitutionally deficient assistance of counsel.62 
Before Padilla was decided in 2010, a few states had already determined 
that failing to counsel a noncitizen on the immigration consequences of a 
guilty plea was ineffective assistance of counsel.63 Additionally, thirty states 
had mandated some version of warning or inquiry regarding deportation 
consequences, most often a boilerplate question such as, “Do you understand 
that your plea of guilty may affect your residency or your status with the 
immigration authorities?”64 However, no particular advice tailored to the 
specific plea or the immigration status of the defendant was required.65 
Immigration consequences—despite the harsh and often permanent sanction 
of deportation—were considered “collateral” rather than “direct,” to which 
the Sixth Amendment did not apply.66 Noncitizens often unwittingly became 
removable based on a lack of counsel regarding immigration consequences or 
affirmative misadvice about such consequences.67 
Padilla altered this landscape by recognizing that defense counsel has a 
constitutional duty to act as crimmigration counsel and advise noncitizen 
 
60 Id. at 58-59. 
61 Id. at 59. 
62 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010). 
63 See, e.g., State v. Paredez, 101 P.3d 799, 805 (N.M. 2004); People v. Pozo, 746 P.2d 523, 
527-29 (Colo. 1987). 
64 Gray Proctor & Nancy J. King, Post Padilla: Padilla’s Puzzles for Review in State and Federal 
Courts, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 239, 244 (2011); see also id. (describing common practices in federal 
and state courts to warn noncitizens of immigration consequences before Padilla). 
65 Id. 
66 GARCIA HERNANDEZ, supra note 10, at 115. 
67 Id. at 115-16. 
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clients on the immigration consequences of guilty pleas.68 Jose Padilla was an 
Army veteran and had been a legal permanent resident for forty years when 
he was convicted of transporting marijuana in the State of Kentucky.69 His 
attorney falsely told him that he should not be concerned about deportation 
since he had been in the United States for so long.70 Upon this advice, Mr. 
Padilla accepted a guilty plea to drug charges that made him immediately 
deportable.71 The Supreme Court of Kentucky held that the effective assistance 
of counsel does not include the right to advice about deportation consequences, 
because immigration consequences are merely collateral consequences.72 
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Sixth Amendment right to 
effective assistance of counsel includes advice regarding deportation, to which 
the Strickland standard applies.73 Deportation, while not a criminal penalty, is 
“uniquely difficult to classify as either a direct or a collateral consequence,” 
given the harsh nature of the penalty.74 The Court explained that as 
immigration law had expanded, more crimes had become deportable offenses 
and the body of law had become increasingly complex.75 For some noncitizens, 
the right to remain in the United States might be of more concern than the 
criminal penalty or jail time, which critically affects the decision of whether to 
accept a plea or proceed to trial.76 Therefore, deportation should not be 
“categorically removed” from Sixth Amendment coverage.77 
In Padilla, the Supreme Court evaluated the performance prong of the 
Strickland test for effective assistance of counsel, concluding that “[t]he 
weight of prevailing professional norms supports the view that counsel must 
advise her client regarding the risk of deportation.”78 Mr. Padilla’s case was 
clear: counsel could have easily discerned from the INA’s plain text that he 
would be deported, but instead provided affirmative misadvice, namely that 
Mr. Padilla should not be concerned about deportation.79 The Court 
explained that when the consequence is clear, “the duty to give correct advice 
is equally clear.”80 However, when the consequences of the plea are “unclear 
 
68 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 360 (2010). 
69 Id. at 359. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 359-60. 
73 Id. at 366. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 361-64, 369. 
76 Id. at 368. 
77 Id. at 366. 
78 See id. at 367 (citing various practice guidelines for criminal defense lawyers, including ABA, 
National Legal Aid and Defender Association, and Department of Justice guidelines). 
79 Id. at 368. 
80 Id. at 369. 
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or uncertain,” the duty of counsel is “more limited”—potentially just advising 
the client that criminal charges may carry a risk of deportation81 and 
suggesting the client speak to an immigration attorney. 
One might criticize Padilla for not going far enough, given the caveat 
limiting the duty of attorneys in unclear or uncertain circumstances, but the 
requirement of affirmative advice is quite a significant step.82 While the duty to 
advise may be weaker in complex cases, the attorney always has an affirmative 
duty to provide counsel, beyond avoiding false or misleading advice.83 
The Supreme Court remanded Mr. Padilla’s case for the state court to 
determine whether he was prejudiced by the constitutionally deficient 
performance of his attorney, and the state court ultimately vacated the 
conviction for prejudice.84 
IV. PADILLA IN PRACTICE: A RIGHT WITHOUT A REMEDY 
Padilla is a momentous decision with the power to greatly improve the 
representation of noncitizens in criminal proceedings, for example, by 
promoting immigration-safe plea deals. While there are successes to celebrate 
in the post-Padilla landscape,85 there is also a mismatch between the 
constitutional right and the available remedy. Noncitizens accept plea 
bargains without effective assistance of counsel, in violation of Padilla, and 
still face removal based on unconstitutional criminal convictions.86 This can 
occur even when the noncitizen had no opportunity to litigate an effective 
 
81 Id. 
82 See GARCIA HERNANDEZ, supra note 10, at 120 (noting the importance of the fact that “[u]nder 
no circumstance is silence an option” for a defense attorney who is advising a noncitizen client). 
83 See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 371 (noting that it “is quintessentially the duty of counsel to provide 
her client with available advice about an issue like deportation . . . .”). 
84 See Padilla v. Commonwealth, 381 S.W.3d 322, 330 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012) (deciding that Jose 
Padilla was prejudiced by the lack of crimmigration counsel). Courts have repeatedly addressed what 
constitutes prejudice under Padilla, with the Supreme Court taking up the question in 2017. See 
generally Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958 (2017). The Court applied the prejudice test from Hill 
in Lee, concluding that despite overwhelming evidence of his guilt, Lee might have rationally decided 
to proceed to trial given his long tenure in the United States, need to care for his elderly parents, and 
repeated inquiries to his attorney about deportation. Id. at 1966-69. The Court explained that 
determining prejudice is a fact-specific inquiry that turns on the actual decisionmaking by the 
defendant, of which the likelihood of conviction is only one factor. Id. at 1966-67. Thus, a Padilla 
petitioner must prove that there is a reasonable probability he or she would have rejected the plea and 
proceeded to trial, but this decision need not turn on the likelihood of success at trial. 
85 See Angie Junck, Nadine K. Wettstein & Wendy S. Wayne, The Mandate of Padilla: How 
Public Defenders Can and Must Provide Effective Assistance of Counsel to Noncitizen Clients, CRIM. JUST. 
24, 26-27 (2016) (describing best practices in providing crimmigration counsel that meets the 
mandate of Padilla, such as supplying in-house crimmigration or Padilla units, hiring immigration 
specialists, and contracting with private immigration attorneys). 
86 See Proctor & King, supra note 64, at 239 (addressing the procedural restrictions to 
raising a Padilla claim). 
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assistance of counsel claim before his or her removal.87 This Part will identify 
and explain some of the barriers to raising legitimate Padilla claims, with a 
primary focus on convictions entered by state criminal courts. 
A. Lack of Right to Counsel for Noncitizens in Removal Proceedings 
One overarching problem is that noncitizens who are not counseled or are 
misadvised during plea bargaining often only discover the immigration 
consequences of their convictions when they are subject to removal 
proceedings.88 The Notice to Appear listing the criminal conviction as the 
basis for removal is the first warning that the guilty plea rendered the person 
removable. Once an individual is in removal proceedings, the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel no longer applies because removal is a civil 
proceeding.89 Noncitizens may seek representation at their own expense or 
proceed unrepresented. A noncitizen who believes the underlying conviction 
was constitutionally invalid must seek to vacate the plea via a procedural 
mechanism in the jurisdiction in which it was entered.90 For the noncitizen, 
this might mean searching for the correct procedural mechanism to raise a 
Padilla claim in state court, while also representing him or herself pro se in a 
removal proceeding. Even with an attorney, the landscape of remedies for 
Padilla violations in state courts is utterly confused and can ultimately leave 
noncitizens without a remedy.91 Without the assistance of counsel, 
 
87 See infra Section IV.C. 
88 See Proctor & King, supra note 64, at 241 (“[O]ften . . . counsel’s error became apparent only 
after immigration proceedings commenced.”). 
89 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b)(4)(A) (2012) (establishing that there is no right to counsel at the 
government’s expense in removal proceedings); see also Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 
730 (1893) (holding that “the order of deportation is not a punishment for crime” and therefore aliens 
ordered to be deported are not “deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”). 
90 See Dorothy A. Harbeck, M. Michelle Park & Yoonji Kim, The Impact of Padilla v. Kentucky 
on the Immigration Courts: Does the Potential for Vacating a Criminal Plea Effect Removal/Deportation 
Proceedings?, 1 ST. JOHN’S J. OF INT’L. & COMP. L. 47, 60 (2016) (explaining that “it is not within 
the Immigration Court’s authority to determine whether alien’s counsel provided ineffective 
assistance in a criminal proceeding”). 
91 Further undermining the available remedies for a Padilla violation, the Supreme Court 
decided in 2013 that Padilla was a “new rule” that would not apply retroactively to guilty pleas 
entered before Padilla came down in 2010. Chaidez v. United States, 568 U.S. 342, 344 (2013). The 
Supreme Court decided that Padilla “altered the law of most jurisdictions” and thus, under the 
Teague standard for determining retroactivity, the Sixth Amendment right to advice on the 
immigration consequences of a guilty plea was a nonretroactive new rule, and not a “garden variety” 
application of the right to effective assistance of counsel as defined in Strickland. Id. at 348-52. 
Despite the holding in Chaidez, states can still apply Padilla retroactively on an individual basis. See 
Kate Lebeaux, Note, Padilla Retroactivity on State Law Grounds, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1651, 1653 (2014) 
(“Despite the Supreme Court’s holding, the question of Padilla’s retroactivity is not definitively 
settled, as states are able to provide broader remedies for constitutional violations than federal law 
requires.”). State courts can determine: 1) that the state constitution provides broader relief than 
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noncitizens may either never realize that their guilty pleas were 
constitutionally invalid or struggle to simultaneously navigate the federal 
immigration court system and state criminal justice system. 
B. Challenges to Using Habeas Corpus and State Post-Conviction Statutes as 
Vehicles for Padilla Relief 
Logically speaking, most people who wish to challenge a criminal 
conviction based on ineffective assistance of counsel outside of the 
immigration context do so very soon after the judgment is entered and while 
they are still serving their sentence. Often the purpose of post-conviction 
relief, including vacating a guilty plea, is to end unjustified custody or 
supervision. After the sentence has been served and probation has ended, 
there are fewer incentives to challenge a conviction outside the immigration 
context. While an older criminal conviction can still have collateral 
consequences—in a search for employment or housing, for example—many 
people use expungement procedures or the pardon process for relief.92 
Noncitizens who plead guilty to a crime are in a unique position compared 
to citizens. First, the constitutional violation occurs in criminal court, but the 
penalty complained of occurs in federal immigration court. Padilla petitioners 
are not seeking relief from the criminal penalty itself, but rather are seeking 
relief from a consequence that may be realized years later, over which the 
state criminal courts have no jurisdiction. Second, the consequences of 
removal and potential bar on reentry are so harsh that many noncitizens will 
wish to challenge a guilty plea long after the sentence has been served, the 
person has been released, and supervision has ended. Third, significant time 
may elapse before the noncitizen even discovers the plea made him or her 
removable, often once a Notice to Appear in immigration court is served. 
However, at this point the mechanisms available to challenge convictions for 
ineffective assistance of counsel are extremely limited. 
 
the reading of Padilla in Chaidez; 2) the state follows a different retroactivity analysis than Teague; 
or 3) the state applies Teague but under a different interpretation than the Supreme Court in Chaidez. 
See GARCIA HERNANDEZ, supra note 10, at 140. For example, Padilla is retroactive in New Mexico 
until 1990, which is when the state began requiring criminal defense attorneys to advise clients on 
immigration consequences of guilty pleas. Id. at 141. Padilla has also been held to have retroactive 
effect in Massachusetts, although New York, Maryland, and South Dakota have reached the opposite 
conclusion and refused to apply Padilla retroactively. See Lebeaux, supra note 91, at 1654. 
92 See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 19, at 684 (explaining that the Board of Immigration Appeals 
has held that “expungement pursuant to a state rehabilitative statute has no impact on a conviction’s 
immigration consequences,” and that “[t]he courts that have addressed the issue have generally agreed”). 
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1. Post-Conviction Relief Statutes 
Probably the most common vehicle to raise an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim is through state post-conviction relief (PCR) statutes. In many 
cases, post conviction is the first time that ineffective assistance of counsel can 
be raised, rather than on direct appeal.93 This is either because the necessary 
information is not in the trial record or the client is not made aware of the 
defect in representation.94 Noncitizens seeking to raise ineffective assistance 
of counsel claims via PCR statutes may face several hurdles, depending on the 
state’s particular requirements. For example, the Post-Conviction Relief Act 
(PCRA) in Pennsylvania has a strict custodial requirement: those who are no 
longer incarcerated and have finished court ordered supervision can no longer 
access post-conviction relief.95 Post-conviction relief statutes also often have 
strict timeliness and due diligence requirements.96 Additionally, there is no 
right to appointed counsel for post-conviction relief under federal law, and 
many states choose not to provide appointed counsel.97 
Finally, inconsistencies between the definition of conviction under state 
law and the INA can cause a noncitizen to become removable without any 
possibility of raising a Padilla claim under state post-conviction relief 
statutes.98 Two examples illustrate the relevance of discrepancies in the 
definition of conviction when it comes to ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims under Padilla. In Colorado, a “deferred judgement” is not a conviction 
for state law purposes even though the defendant is required to plead guilty 
and submit to probation.99 However, such a disposition does meet the INA 
 
93 Unless the client has identified the incompetence of counsel and sought a new attorney, it is 
unlikely that the client would know to file a direct appeal asserting ineffective assistance of counsel. 
See Proctor & King, supra note 64, at 240 (explaining the reasons that Padilla claims are usually 
unreviewable on direct appeal and first heard in post-conviction proceedings). 
94 Id. 
95 See 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 9541–9546 (West 1988) (explaining that the 
PCRA provides relief only to those who are currently imprisoned, or are on probation or parole for 
the conviction they wish to challenge). 
96 See, e.g., id. § 9545 (explaining that the statute of limitation under the PCRA in 
Pennsylvania is within one year of judgement becoming final on appeal); Proctor & King, supra note 
64, at 241 (describing how, in order to access collateral review of a final conviction under federal law, 
“[a] federal petitioner has one year to file his claims, beginning on the date the judgement becomes 
final”). Under Arkansas state law, a petitioner has only ninety days from state trial court judgment 
or sixty days from state appellate court decision, and the time requirement cannot be waived. ARK. 
CODE ANN. § 37.2(c) (2015); see also State v. Tejeda-Acosta, 427 S.W. 3d 673, 678-79 (Ark. 2013) 
(applying Rule 37 time constraints). New Jersey is more generous, but still requires a PCR petition 
to be filed within five years of the conviction. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 3:22-12(a)(1), (b) (West 2011). 
97 See Commonwealth v. Holmes, 79 A.3d 562, 581 (Pa. 2013) (holding that there is no federal 
constitutional right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings and thus petitioner had no right 
to counsel under the PCRA). 
98 See supra Section I.F. 
99 GARCIA HERNANDEZ, supra note 10, at 144. 
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definition of “conviction” for immigration purposes because the plea is 
entered and the defendant submits to court-ordered supervision.100 This is 
problematic later if the noncitizen seeks Padilla relief to vacate the guilty plea 
based on lack of counsel about immigration consequences.101 Since there has 
been no state law conviction, the defendant cannot access Colorado post-
conviction relief to vacate the plea, but remains removable based on the 
conviction.102 
In Tennessee, a defendant who completes a diversion program has the 
conviction immediately expunged, but expungement does not affect the 
conviction for immigration purposes.103 There is no access to post-conviction 
proceedings since there is no conviction under the state law definition after 
the diversion program is completed.104 However, the guilty or nolo contendre 
plea, supervision, and charging of court fees to the defendant are considered a 
“conviction” under immigration law.105 An ostensibly favorable disposition—
participation in a diversion program and expungement of the charge—can 
have dire immigration consequences for a noncitizen defendant. The potential 
for Padilla violations is particularly high in these circumstances. Defense 
counsel is likely to accept a favorable plea, such as deferred adjudication or 
diversion, but less likely to be aware of the incongruent definitions of 
“conviction” for the purposes of state law versus immigration law. 
2. Habeas Corpus Relief 
Another common vehicle to raise ineffective assistance of counsel claims, 
habeas corpus, is also subject to strict confines that are problematic for Padilla 
claims. A writ of habeas corpus is a petition for release from unlawful custody 
to which all persons have a constitutional right.106 Because habeas relief seeks 
to attack unlawful restraints on liberty, habeas corpus petitions have strict 
custodial requirements. The petitioner must either be in physical custody or 
be subject to restrictions on liberty imposed by the court, such as monitored 
 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 See id. (“[A] migrant can be removed but cannot challenge removal by arguing that the 
immigration law conviction resulted from unconstitutionally poor representation.”). 
103 See Rodriguez v. States, 437 S.W. 3d 450, 457 (Tenn. 2014) (“[W]e conclude that a guilty 
plea expunged following successful completion of judicial diversion is not a conviction within the 
meaning of the Post-Conviction Act.”). 
104 Id. at 455. 
105 GARCIA HERNANDEZ, supra note 10, at 144-45. 
106 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall 
not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the Public Safety may require it.”); 
28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (2012) (“The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless . . . [h]e 
is in custody under or by color of the authority of the United States [or] . . . [h]e is in custody in 
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States . . .”). 
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supervision.107 Habeas relief is unavailable to a host of noncitizens with 
Padilla claims: those who served their sentences and have since been released, 
received a sentence of time served, received a suspended sentence, or 
completed a diversion program that is still a conviction for immigration 
purposes. A potential sentence of one year or more can trigger removability 
under some categories of the INA, meaning that many noncitizens who serve 
only very short sentences and thus have a limited window to file a writ of 
habeas corpus are still removable.108 
3. Writs of Coram Nobis 
A third potential procedural mechanism to raise a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel under Padilla is a writ of coram nobis.109 A writ of coram 
nobis is a procedural mechanism to collaterally attack a criminal conviction 
for a person who is no longer in custody and therefore cannot access habeas 
relief or state post-conviction remedies with custodial requirements.110 On 
the federal level, coram nobis relief must be sought in a timely manner, 
unless the petitioner can demonstrate “a sound reason for failing to seek 
relief earlier.”111 While a writ of coram nobis may be available in situations 
where state post-conviction relief or petitions for habeas corpus are not, 
there are still significant limitations on the availability of this writ. 
Unfortunately, not all states offer relief from state convictions via coram 
 
107 See, e.g., LEGAL ACTION CTR., AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL,  INTRODUCTION TO 
HABEAS CORPUS 4 (2008) (“Although § 2241 says that habeas corpus is available only when a person 
is ‘in custody,’ courts have interpreted the statute to not require actual physical restraint; rather 
other restrictions on liberty can satisfy the custody requirement.”); Proctor & King, supra note 64, 
at 243 (“Habeas relief, in state or federal court, is available only to a petitioner who is still serving 
the sentence for the judgment he is attacking.”). 
108 The REAL ID Act of 2005 further limits access to habeas relief for noncitizens in 
immigration detention who might wish to challenge their removal order based on ineffective 
assistance of counsel during the criminal proceedings. See LEGAL ACTION CTR., supra note 107, at 
2 (“The REAL ID Act of 2005 purports to eliminate habeas corpus jurisdiction over final orders of 
removal, deportation, and exclusion and consolidate such review in the court of appeals.” (footnote 
omitted)). Removal is likely a restriction on liberty, but jurisdiction over removal orders is found 
solely and exclusively in the courts of appeals. See Real ID Act § 106, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5) (2012) 
(“Notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), including [habeas, 
mandamus, and all Writs Act], . . . a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals 
. . . shall be the sole and exclusive means for juridical review of an order of removal entered or issued 
under any provision of this chapter . . . .”). 
109 See Chaidez v. United States, 568 U.S. 342, 345 n.1 (2013) (assuming without deciding that 
Ms. Chaidez could proceed on a coram nobis petition but rejecting her claim for relief based on the 
fact that her conviction became final before the Padilla decision). 
110 Id. 
111 See Proctor & King, supra note 64, at 243; see also id. (“[A]n unexplained delay will bar relief 
for a Padilla claim that could easily have been raised earlier.”). 
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nobis petitions, and even states that do offer such a mechanism may not 
consider ineffective assistance of counsel to be a basis for relief.112 
Pennsylvania, for example, does not allow a writ of coram nobis to raise a 
Padilla claim for relief.113 The lack of availability of a coram nobis petition, 
coupled with the strict temporal and custodial limitations in the PCRA, 
severely limits noncitizens’ options to raise an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim in Pennsylvania. A hypothetical noncitizen who does not 
receive immigration advice about his plea in Pennsylvania state court, and 
who also receives a short, noncustodial sentence for a controlled substance 
offense or a crime that could carry a penalty up to one year, may have no 
avenue for relief under Pennsylvania state law. Hypothetically, a legal 
permanent resident sentenced to time served on a marijuana possession 
offense is left without remedy and could be removed for this conviction. 
Noncitizens with the least serious convictions—convictions that defense 
counsel without expertise in immigration law are most likely to misinterpret 
as nonthreatening for immigration purposes—are in the most danger of 
removal based on unconstitutional convictions. 
V. A STATE-BASED SOLUTION TO THE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
PADILLA 
A. States Can Create New Rules of Criminal Procedure to Raise Padilla Claims 
The challenges to bringing successful Padilla claims in state courts are 
numerous, but states are not without options for overcoming the ineffective 
assistance of Padilla.114 In states that have foreclosed or imposed strict 
requirements on Padilla relief via PCR statutes, habeas corpus, and writs of 
coram nobis, the option remains for the state to create a new rule of state 
 
112 Id. 
113 See Commonwealth v. Descardes, 136 A.3d 493, 503 (Pa. 2016) (“[T]he PCRA is the only 
method of obtaining collateral review.”); see also People v. Kim, 202 P.3d 436, 453-54 (Cal. 2009) 
(holding that claims for ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be raised via a writ of coram nobis, 
which is reserved for claims based on newly discovered facts). 
114 In addition to the possibility of creating procedural mechanisms to raise Padilla claims, 
states also wield considerable power over removals through substantive criminal law and sentencing. 
For example, state legislatures decide which crimes carry a punishment over one year. See GARCIA 
HERNANDEZ, supra note 10, at 201 (explaining how “California, Illinois, Nevada, and Washington 
altered their penal codes to cap maximum possible penalty for some misdemeanors at 364 days” in 
order to address the common situation in which noncitizens were convicted of minor crimes and 
received little or no jail time, but remained deportable because of the maximum possible penalty 
under state law). While the primary focus of this Comment is procedural fairness for noncitizens 
with invalid guilty pleas under Padilla, substantive changes in state criminal law may ultimately have 
an even greater impact for noncitizens convicted of minor offenses by making fewer offenses 
removable convictions in the first place. 
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criminal procedure to raise Padilla claims.115 In fact, in states where there is 
political support for such a rule, it is the best option for implementing Padilla 
on the state level. State legislatures can set the parameters for the rule, even 
tailoring the procedure specifically for Padilla claims: loosen or eliminate 
temporal and custodial requirements, mirror the language of the Padilla decision, 
and apply the rule retroactively to pleas entered before Padilla became final. 
California is a model for such a rule.116 Section 1473.7 of the California 
Penal Code went into effect on January 1, 2017.117 The California law permits 
people who are no longer in custody to vacate a conviction or sentence—not 
limited to guilty plea—due to “a prejudicial error damaging the [defendant’s] 
ability to meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly accept the 
actual or potential adverse immigration consequences of a plea of guilty or nolo 
contendere.”118 Previously, there was no procedural mechanism in California to 
challenge a conviction after custody ended, leaving noncitizens with Padilla 
claims without a remedy.119 The language of section 1473.7 of the California 
Penal Code clearly applies to the failure to research and advise a noncitizen 
client on the specific immigration consequences of a plea.120 Additionally, the 
 
115 See Kim, 202 P.3d at 456 (“Because the Legislature remains free to enact further statutory 
remedies for those in defendant’s position, we are disinclined to reinterpret the historic writ of error 
coram nobis to provide the remedy he seeks.”). 
116 New York also has a criminal procedural motion to raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
that does not have a statute of limitations or custodial limitation, known as a 440 motion. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. 
LAW § 440.10(1)(h) (McKinney 2016). A 440 motion would function much the same as the California rule 
discussed in this section; the noncitizen or crimmigration counsel would be required to prove both prongs 
of the Strickland test to succeed. See Post-Padilla Post-Conviction Relief in New York State Courts, IMMIGRANT 
DEFENSE PROJECT, https://immigrantdefenseproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Model-Motion-
Doc.-0.5-Guide-to-Accompany-Motion.final_.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z8XJ-MJZN] (last visited Oct. 11, 
2018) (“To win a 440 motion under Padilla, you must establish that 1) the advice, or lack thereof, regarding 
immigration consequences was deficient in comparison to the prevailing professional norms, and 2) the 
client suffered prejudice as a result of #1.”). While the language of the rule does not track the Padilla 
case as closely as the California rule, the New York rule clearly applies to convictions entered in 
violation of the defendants Sixth Amendment rights. Id.; see also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW 
§ 440.10(1)(h) (McKinney 2016) (providing that a judgment may be vacated if it was obtained in 
violation of the Constitution). A successful 440 motion places the noncitizen “in the position he 
found himself immediately prior to the plea,” at which point he may seek a more favorable plea, 
seek to dismiss the charges, or go on to try his chances at trial. Post-Padilla Post-Conviction Relief in 
New York State Courts, IMMIGRANT DEFENSE PROJECT, https://immigrantdefenseproject.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/04/Model-Motion-Doc.-0.5-Guide-to-Accompany-Motion.final_.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Z8XJ-MJZN] (last visited Oct. 11, 2018). 
117 Rose Cahn, How to Use New California Law Penal Code § 1473.7 to Vacate Legally Invalid 
Convictions, IMMIGRANT LEGAL RESOURCE CTR., Oct. 2016, at 1. 
118 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1473.7(a)(1) (West 2017). 
119 See Cahn, supra note 117, at 2 (explaining how the California Supreme Court ruled coram 
nobis petitions could not be vehicles for raising ineffective assistance of counsel claims, “shut[ting] 
the courtroom doors” for defendants no longer in custody). 
120 See, e.g., id. at 3 (noting that § 1473.7(a)(1) will provide a cause of action where “defense 
counsel violated the duty to investigate and accurately advise the defendant about the specific 
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requirement of “prejudicial error” can be measured by the same prejudice 
standard as ineffective assistance of counsel claims under Strickland and Hill.121 
The California law does have a timeliness requirement, but it is 
significantly more generous than many of the requirements under PCR 
statutes.122 Meeting the “reasonable diligence” standard requires that the 
moving party file at the later date of either receiving the charging document 
for a removal proceeding—the Notice to Appear—or the date the removal 
order based on the conviction or sentence becomes final.123 
Section 1473.7 of the California Penal Code is an advantageous option for 
several reasons. First, if the motion is granted, the conviction ceases to exist 
for all purposes, including not only immigration consequences but also 
sentence enhancements and registration requirements.124 Second, because of 
the less restrictive timing and lack of custodial requirements, the motion will 
be available to noncitizens who had minor convictions with short sentences, 
even those who are not aware of the consequences until they are served a notice 
to appear.125 Finally, the law is specifically tailored to Padilla claims, with clear 
and express language mirroring the decision. Rather than being left to scour 
state criminal procedural law for an option to raise an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim, even a noncitizen filing a motion pro se has a clearly applicable 
procedural rule to remedy ineffective crimmigration counsel. 
B. Limitations of State-Based Remedies to Padilla Claims 
In an ideal world, every state would pass a criminal procedural law like 
section 1473.7 of the California Penal Code. However, in reality there are several 
limitations on state-based solutions to the ineffective assistance of Padilla. The 
first and most obvious barrier is the lack of political will to address a problem 
 
immigration consequences of a plea”); see also CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1016.2-3 (West 2016) (justifying 
the § 1473.7(a)(1) remedy when defense counsel failed to “investigate and advise regarding the 
immigration consequences of [a plea]”). For example, this remedy would have provided relief to the 
defendant in In re Resendiz, 25 Cal.4th 230 (2001), whose claim was based on his counsel’s failure to 
“investigate immigration consequences or research immigration law.” Id. at 250. 
121 See Cahn, supra note 117, at 4 (explaining that “prejudice” is met by establishing a reasonable 
probability that the noncitizen would have rejected the guilty plea, attempted to negotiate an alternative 
disposition, or continued to trial but for counsel’s failure to advise on potential immigration consequences). 
122 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1473.7(b)(1-2) (West 2016) (requiring a motion to be filed at the 
later of either “(1) The date the moving party receives a notice to appear in immigration court or 
other notice from immigration authorities that asserts the conviction or sentence as a basis for 
removal;” or “(2) The date a removal order against the moving party, based on the existence of the 
conviction or sentence, becomes final.”). 
123 Id. 
124 Cahn, supra note 117, at 6. 
125 Id. at 2 (noting the “holes in California’s criminal procedural landscape” and the particularly 
devastating consequences these holes had on noncitizens with unconstitutional criminal convictions). 
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affecting only noncitizens, especially those with criminal convictions.126 It is not 
a surprise that the most encompassing and immigrant-friendly criminal 
procedural remedy came out of California. With the nation at a political 
impasse about helping even a popular and sympathetic group of noncitizens 
such as DACA recipients, it is hard, if not impossible, to imagine a wave of 
state legislatures passing criminal procedural rules to protect noncitizens 
from the immigration consequences of guilty pleas.127 
Second, state-based solutions lead to a lack of uniformity among states 
about which noncitizens are removable, even though immigration law is 
federal law. In the current landscape, a noncitizen in California and a 
noncitizen in Pennsylvania might be accused of the exact same state criminal 
violation, accept the same plea offer with the same inadequate crimmigration 
counsel, and both end up in removal proceedings; the noncitizen in California 
could move to vacate the plea whereas the noncitizen in Pennsylvania would 
be left remediless and be removed. 
Finally, there is a federalism issue at play between state courts and federal 
immigration courts. States lack the incentive to expend time and resources 
addressing what is ultimately viewed as a federal immigration issue.128 Lasch 
describes the idea of requiring states alone to implement the Padilla decision 
as “an unfunded mandate.”129 Criminal procedural rules like section 1473.7 of 
the California Penal Code undermine the finality of state criminal convictions, 
in the interest of upholding federal immigration laws. Once a mechanism to 
raise Padilla claims is in place, states will also continue to spend resources 
litigating the claims. An ineffective assistance of counsel petition, via a writ of 
coram nobis or a law like section 1473.7, will likely require a hearing with 
evidence and testimony on both prongs of the Strickland test. In states 
applying Padilla retroactively, remedying Padilla violations will also require 
making decisions about years- or even decades-old criminal convictions. 
 
126 Addressing the nation in 2014 about immigration reform, President Obama applauded the 
eighty percent increase in “deportations of criminals,” proclaiming his goal of removing “felons, not 
families; criminals, not children; gang members, not a mom who’s working hard to provide for her 
kids.” Barack Obama, U.S. President, Address to the Nation on Immigration Reform (Nov. 20, 2014). 
127 See Scott Clement & David Nakamura, Survey Finds Strong Support for ‘Dreamers’, WASH. 
POST (Sept. 25, 2017),  https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/survey-finds-strong-support-
for-dreamers/2017/09/24/df3c885c-a16f-11e7-b14f-f41773cd5a14_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_ 
term=.7b67ccbe4991 [https://perma.cc/T7WM-UDJK] (finding that eighty-six percent of those 
polled supported allowing DACA recipients to stay in the United States). Furthermore, popular 
support for protecting noncitizens from the immigration consequences of minor criminal convictions 
may be better aimed at changing substantive criminal law and state sentencing laws so that fewer 
offenses make noncitizens removable to begin with. See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
128 See Lasch, supra note 7, at 2159 (“[S]tate courts have little incentive to upset state criminal 
convictions based on federal immigration consequences.”). 
129 Id. at 2145. 
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On the other hand, immigration courts are federal civil courts, with no 
expertise in state criminal law and no power to overturn criminal convictions 
in the state courts.130 From the federal immigration judge’s perspective, 
ensuring that guilty pleas for state criminal law violations are entered into 
knowingly and voluntarily is the business of state courts alone. States have an 
interest in upholding the integrity of the state criminal justice system, 
including for noncitizens, and should not shift this burden onto the federal 
immigration courts. From this point of view, federal immigration courts should 
be able to presume that a conviction under state law is constitutionally valid, 
and states should be responsible for remedying Sixth Amendment violations. 
VI. FEDERAL SOLUTION 
Regardless of whether the state or federal immigration courts have the 
more convincing argument regarding the responsibility for remedying Padilla 
violations, in the meantime noncitizens are being removed based on 
unconstitutional criminal convictions. The ideal solution is to share the 
burden between states and federal immigration courts, while encouraging 
states to implement mechanisms to raise Padilla claims in state courts. 
Federal immigration courts should decline to order noncitizens removed 
based on unconstitutional criminal convictions, including convictions based 
on guilty pleas where the noncitizens had no procedural mechanism to 
challenge the underlying conviction after discovering the constitutional 
defect. In response, states that are concerned about having the validity of 
state criminal convictions questioned in federal civil courts have the option 
of implementing a procedure to raise Padilla claims in state court. This is not 
to suggest that the federal immigration courts can or should determine the 
factual guilt or innocence of noncitizens, but rather the federal immigration 
courts should interpret the definition of “conviction” under the INA so as not 
to include convictions that are invalid under Padilla.131 
A. Defining “Conviction” for Immigration Purposes 
Congress need not amend the INA in order for immigration courts to 
implement a federal remedy to the ineffective assistance of Padilla.132 
 
130 See generally Harbeck et al., supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
131 See Matter of Roberts, 20 I & N Dec. 294, 301 (B.I.A. 1991) (“While inquiry may be had 
into the circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime in order to determine whether a 
favorable exercise of discretion is warranted, it is impermissible to go behind a record of conviction 
to reassess an alien’s ultimate guilt or innocence.”). 
132 However, a congressional remedy remains open. Cf. Lasch, supra note 7, at 2156 (suggesting 
a decision rule to be used in immigration courts that would require either the opportunity to litigate 
a Padilla claim in state courts or provision of counsel to litigate the claim in immigration court). In 
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Immigration courts, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), circuit courts, 
and, if the issue reaches it, the Supreme Court, should read the definition of 
“conviction” in the INA to apply only to convictions where noncitizens were 
afforded the Sixth Amendment right to crimmigration counsel announced in 
Padilla. Based on principles of statutory interpretation, legislative history, and 
case law interpreting the definition of “conviction,” the correct interpretation 
of “conviction” excludes convictions entered in the absence of the 
constitutional right to effective assistance of crimmigration counsel.  
When interpreting the definition of “conviction,” the aim of the 
reviewing court is to discern the intent of Congress.133 First, Congress has 
not “directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”134 Congress added a 
statutory definition of the word “conviction” to the INA as part of the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA).135 
Because Padilla was not decided until fourteen years later, the issue of 
convictions based on guilty pleas with ineffective crimmigration counsel is 
not addressed by the plain language of the statute.136  
Because the plain language of the statute does not address convictions 
entered in violation of Padilla, the court should next consider principles of 
interpretation in the specific context of removal proceedings.137 In the context 
of interpreting a statutory provision related to deportation, the Supreme 
Court has dictated that the language of the provision should be construed 
 
contrast, this Comment suggests a judicial solution, relying on evidence of the intent of Congress 
in defining a conviction for immigration purposes. 
133 See Orabi v. United States, 738 F.3d 535, 545 (3d Cir. 2013) (“Our task in interpreting a 
statute ‘is to discern legislative intent.’”). 
134 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).  
135 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) (2012) (“The term conviction means . . . a formal judgment of 
guilt of the alien entered by a court or, if adjudication of guilt has been withheld, where . . . (i) a 
judge or jury has found the alien guilty or the alien has entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or 
has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt, and (ii) the judge has ordered some form 
of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the alien’s liberty to be imposed.”). 
136 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44. Because we are not faced with an explicit DHS interpretation of 
whether a conviction entered in violation of Padilla meets the definition of conviction under the INA, to 
which Chevron deference may or may not be owed, this Comment does not undertake a full analysis 
under Chevron. See id. at 844 (holding that, once the court determines that Congress has not directly 
addressed the issue, deference is owed to a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous provision by an 
executive agency). Rather, the purpose of this Comment is to provide support for an interpretation of 
conviction that upholds the constitutional rights of noncitizens in removal proceedings.  
137 See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340-41 (1997) (noting the “our inquiry must 
cease if the statutory language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent and 
consistent….” and otherwise the meaning of statutory language “is determined by reference to the 
language itself, the specific context in which the language is used, and the broader context of the 
statute as a whole.”); see also Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 552-53 (1987) 
(“[W]hen statutory language is plain . . . that is ordinarily the ‘end of the matter.’”).  
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narrowly and that doubt should be resolved in favor of the noncitizen.138 Given 
the harsh and drastic nature of removal, the court should “not assume that 
Congress meant to entrench on [the noncitizen’s] freedom beyond that which 
is required by the narrowest of several possible meanings of the words used.”139 
These principles support a narrow interpretation of conviction that errs on the 
side of protecting noncitizens when selecting among possible meanings.  
 The legislative history, while sparse, also sheds some light on the intention 
of Congress in drafting the definition of conviction. The definition is 
purposefully broad.140 The express intent was to include deferred 
adjudications in the definition of conviction, thus overruling a previous BIA 
decision finding that such convictions do not always carry immigration 
consequences.141 Deferred adjudication, while it varies state to state, is a 
disposition where the court finds that the defendant committed, or has 
admitted sufficient facts to be found guilty of, the charged offense, but 
suspends the sentence so long as the defendant complies with court-ordered 
conditions or probation. In defining conviction to include deferred 
adjudications, Congress sought to alleviate discrepancies between state 
procedures for entering deferred adjudications that would lead some deferred 
adjudications to be considered convictions for immigration purposes, and 
other convictions not to count for immigration purposes.142 For example, 
some states do not impose a finding of guilt when a sentence of deferred 
adjudication is entered, but rather do so only if the conditions of probation 
are violated and another hearing is held.143 In these states, a second hearing 
would be required before the defendant was “convicted,” and those who 
completed the probation period would never have a conviction for 
immigration purposes.144 Other states impose a finding of guilt at the time 
the sentence of deferred adjudication is entered, but merely suspend the 
sentence for the period of probation.145 These defendants would be 
considered convicted for immigration purposes.146 To avoid this discrepancy, 
 
138 See, e.g., Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948) (construing ambiguity narrowly 
because “deportation is a drastic measure”). 
139 Id.; see also In re Salazar-Regino, 23 I & N Dec. 223, 241-42 (B.I.A. 2002) (Rosenburg, J., 
dissenting) (applying the doctrine of constitutional doubt announced in Fong Haw Tan to the current 
definition of “conviction”). 
140 See supra Section I.F.  
141 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-828, at 224 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) (noting that the Board of 
Immigration Appeals in Matter of Ozkok, 19  I & N Dec. 546 (B.I.A. 1988), “while making it more 
difficult for alien criminals to escape [immigration consequences, did] not go far enough”).  
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. 
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Congress specifically included “deferred adjudication” in the definition of 
conviction for immigration purposes.147  
While Congress “deliberately broaden[ed] the scope of the definition of 
‘conviction’” beyond that adopted by the BIA, there is nothing to suggest 
Congress intended to include convictions that lacked procedural and 
constitutional safeguards.148 The discussion of deferred adjudications is limited 
to the lack of uniformity between state criminal processes for entering deferred 
adjudications.149 There is no suggestion that deferred adjudications violate the 
constitutional rights of defendants, like a conviction entered without 
crimmigration counsel. In fact, Congress decided to overrule Ozkok and clearly 
defined “conviction” to include deferred adjudications in order to achieve “a 
uniform federal approach” to defining conviction, avoiding “different 
treatment, based solely on where the offense occurred, of aliens guilty of the 
same misconduct . . . .”150 Adopting the interpretation of conviction suggested 
by this Comment would also provide a uniform federal approach to overcome 
inconsistencies in the availability of Padilla relief among states.151 
Case law interpreting the meaning of conviction also sheds light on 
whether convictions in violation of Padilla or with no mechanism to raise a 
Padilla claim should be considered “convictions” for the purpose of removal. 
The language of the INA is quite broad in defining “conviction;” however, 
the definition also has constitutional limitations.152 Relevant case law 
addressing whether specified offenses fall within the meaning of conviction 
for immigration purposes supports the suggested limitation. According to the 
case law, only a conviction where the noncitizen defendant was provided the 
protections “normally attendant upon criminal adjudication” are valid for 
immigration purposes.153 For example, a conviction where the noncitizen 
 
147 Id. 
148 Id; see also In re Eslamizar, 23 I & N Dec. 684, 688 n.5 (B.I.A. 2004) (“Rather, the history 
demonstrates that Congress was concerned mainly, if not exclusively, with clarifying the effect of 
post-proceeding rehabilitative actions on whether an alien was deemed convicted.”). 
149 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-828, at 224 (1996) (Conf. Rep.)  (“[T]here exist in the various States 
a myriad of provisions for ameliorating the effects of a conviction.”).  
150 In re Mauro Roldan-Santoyo, 22 I & N Dec. 512, 517 (B.I.A. 1999).  
151 Admittedly, Congress could also decide that in order to eliminate “the need to refer to the 
vagaries of the states[]” in determining whether a noncitizen was convicted for immigration purposes 
(i.e., look at which states provide Padilla relief and which do not in order to determine if a conviction is 
supported by adequate procedural safeguards), “conviction” should be amended to include all guilty pleas, 
regardless of the availability of Padilla relief. Id. at 518. However, such a provision could raise Due Process 
objections for ordering removal of noncitizens despite the protections guaranteed by Padilla. Unless or 
until Congress intervenes to clarify the definition, the congressional record supports an interpretation 
of conviction that counteracts the “vagaries of the states” in providing Padilla relief. Id.  
152 See GARCIA HERNANDEZ, supra note 10, at 29 (“Despite the breadth of the conviction 
definition, it is not limitless.”). 
153 Id. 
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was not provided appointed counsel, afforded the right to a trial by jury, 
or the prosecution was not required to prove its case beyond a reasonable 
doubt would all be invalid convictions for immigration purposes.154 
In In re Eslamizar, the BIA found that a conviction of a noncitizen 
under the standard of preponderance of the evidence rather than beyond 
a reasonable doubt “does not fall within the meaning of the term 
‘conviction’ under section 101(a)(48)(A)” of the INA.155 Hadi Eslamizar 
was an Iranian native and Legal Permanent Resident of the United 
States.156 He was convicted of a misdemeanor theft offense in Oregon and 
served two years’ probation.157 Three years later, he was convicted of a 
second theft offense that was treated as a “Class A violation,” punishable 
by a maximum fine of $600, rather than as a misdemeanor.158 To be found 
guilty, the state was only required to prove guilt by a preponderance of 
the evidence rather than beyond a reasonable doubt.159 Removal 
proceedings were initiated against Mr. Eslamizar based on the 
commission of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude.160 
The BIA held that, although Mr. Eslamizar had been found guilty in an 
Oregon court, the conviction did not meet the definition provided in the 
INA.161 The BIA conceded that “a literal reading of the conviction definition 
persuaded us earlier that the respondent’s offense was a ‘conviction’ for 
immigration purposes” because the state treated the conviction as a criminal 
violation and entered a judgement of guilt.162 However, the BIA changed 
course and concluded that “we do not find the definition to be clear or to 
dictate such an outcome.”163 Proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each 
element of an offense is a bedrock constitutional principle.164 A conviction 
where the noncitizen defendant is denied this safeguard cannot be 
considered a conviction for immigration purposes.165 
Situations in which there has been an alleged Padilla violation, and the 
noncitizen has no procedural mechanism to raise an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim upon discovery of the violation, should be treated similarly. 
Like the BIA in Eslamizar, courts should look beyond the literal text of the 
 
154 Id. 
155 In re Eslamizar, 23 I & N Dec. 684, 688 (B.I.A. 2004). 
156 Id. at 685. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. at 685 n.3. 
159 Id. at 685. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. at 686. 
162 Id. at 686-87. 
163 Id. at 687. 
164 Id. at 688. 
165 Id. at 689. 
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INA definition of conviction to the “more sensible reading of the statute.”166 
A guilty plea entered without crimmigration counsel may be a conviction 
under the literal meaning of the statutes, but the real question is “whether 
Congress would have intended” the conviction to support a removal.167 Cases 
such as Eslamizar, Castillo, and decisions discussed in Castillo168 suggest that 
Congress did not have “so expansive a reach in mind” to cover convictions 
without crimmigration counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.169 
Applying Eslamizar, as outlined by the Third Circuit in Castillo, courts should 
consider whether a conviction where the defendant was denied effective 
assistance of counsel—as required by the Sixth Amendment—was entered in a 
“true criminal proceeding” where the defendant was provided “the 
 
166 Castillo v. United States, 729 F.3d 296, 306 (3d Cir. 2013); see also id. (quoting Eslamizar to 
describe how “the BIA expressly rejected a literal reading of the term ‘conviction’” in favor of “a far 
more sensible reading of the statute”). In Castillo v. United States, the Third Circuit rejected the BIA 
finding that Eslamizar only applied to convictions where no proof beyond a reasonable doubt was 
required and ordered the BIA to reevaluate whether a municipal court adjudication for shoplifting, 
considered a “disorderly persons offense” under New Jersey law, was a conviction for purposes of 
the INA. Id. at 298-99. Mr. Castillo argued that, because a disorderly persons offense was not a 
crime under New Jersey law and defendants were not entitled to a trial by jury, the adjudication did 
not qualify as conviction of a crime for immigration purposes. Id. at 299. The Third Circuit, 
interpreting Eslamizar, found that the BIA had rejected a literal reading of “conviction” in favor of 
“a far more sensible reading,” which requires the court to consider whether the conviction is 
supported by the constitutional safeguards required in a “true criminal proceeding.” Id. at 306 (citing 
Eslamizar, 23 I & N Dec. at 686-87). The rationale of Eslamizar requires consideration of other 
constitutional safeguards besides the right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt, for example the right 
to trial by jury that Mr. Castillo was denied. Id. at 307. The Third Circuit remanded for the BIA to 
conduct an open-ended inquiry into whether Mr. Castillo’s adjudication was entered in a true 
criminal proceeding where he was afforded “the constitutional safeguards normally attendant upon 
a criminal adjudication.” Id. at 311 (citing Eslamizar, 23 I & N Dec. at 687). 
167 Id. at 301. 
168 See, e.g., In re Cuellar-Gomez, 25 I & N Dec. 850, 852-55 (B.I.A. 2012) (finding that a 
judgment entered by a Kansas municipal court for violation of a city ordinance prohibiting the 
possession of marijuana meets the statutory definition of conviction because municipal court judges 
possess the power to enter judgments of guilt and impose fines or incarceration in marijuana 
possession cases, the prosecution was required to prove the charge beyond a reasonable doubt, and 
the judgment of guilt represented a conviction for purposes of calculating a defendant’s criminal 
history, and the defendant had the constitutional and statutory right to appeal the decision to a state 
district court and demand a trial by jury); In re Bajric, A077 686-506, 2010 WL 5173974, at *2 (B.I.A. 
Nov. 30, 2010) (determining that a conviction for stealing under a Missouri municipal ordinance 
does not meet the INA definition of conviction because the proceeding, although quasi-criminal, 
“clearly remained civil in nature in that it did not bar a prosecution for the same offense by the state, 
and his conviction for a violation of a municipal ordinance, unlike those for misdemeanors and 
felonies, is not admissible for impeachment purposes.”); In re Rivera-Valencia, 24 I & N Dec. 484, 
486-88 (B.I.A. 2008) (finding that a court-martial entered by the United States Armed Forces is a 
conviction entered in a genuine criminal proceeding because service members in court-martial 
proceedings are afforded the procedural protections afforded in civilian courts such as the privilege 
against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to representation by counsel at public expense, and 
the right to call witnesses and present evidence). 
169 Eslamizar, 23 I & N Dec. at 687. 
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constitutional safeguards normally attendant upon a criminal adjudication.”170 
The Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel is a vital 
constitutional safeguard, the denial of which is sufficient to find that a guilty 
plea does not meet the definition of “conviction” under the INA. 
Finally, federal regulations suggest that the agency charged with 
implementing the removal provisions of the INA is also concerned with the 
procedural fairness of convictions that serve as the basis for removal. Federal 
regulations exclude certain convictions from immigration consequences 
because of a lack of procedural safeguards, such as convictions entered in 
absentia or based on fabricated charges for purely political offenses.171 
Resolving “any lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes in favor of” the 
noncitizen, the best interpretation of “conviction” excludes convictions 
entered without effective crimmigration counsel.172 
B. Burden of Proof that a Conviction Is Constitutionally Invalid 
Unless noncitizens were afforded a mechanism to raise a Padilla claim, 
these guilty pleas should be invalid for immigration purposes. Procedurally, 
the question remains of how and when the issue of ineffective crimmigration 
counsel should be raised when a noncitizen is subject to removal based on an 
allegedly invalid guilty plea. In a deportation proceeding, the government has 
the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the noncitizen is 
deportable.173 If the noncitizen has already accessed post-conviction relief and 
had the conviction vacated in state court, the immigration courts must give 
full faith and credit to the decision of the state court and dismiss the 
proceeding.174 Likewise, if the noncitizen raised a Padilla claim in state court 
and lost on the merits, the conviction must be considered legitimate for the 
purposes of immigration law and the noncitizen is removable.175 It would be 
unreasonable to give a second bite at the apple in federal immigration courts. 
If the government can prove that there is a facially legitimate conviction in 
the state court that appears to meet the definition of “conviction,” but the 
 
170 Castillo, 729 F.3d at 300.  
171 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (2012) (excluding convictions for a purely political offense 
from the meaning of conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude, including where the offense 
stems from fabricated charges); 22 C.F.R. § 40.21(a)(4) (1999) (excluding convictions in absentia 
from the meaning of conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude); see also 22 C.F.R. 
§ 40.22(b),(d) (1997) (applying the above exclusions for the definition of conviction for multiple 
criminal convictions). 
172 INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 320 (2001). 
173 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A) (2012). 
174 See Harbeck et al., supra note 90, at 59-60 (“[T]he [BIA] gives full faith and credit to state 
court actions that purport to vacate a non-citizen’s criminal conviction.”). 
175 Id. at 60. 
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noncitizen has not had the opportunity to raise a Padilla claim,176 then the 
noncitizen should be allowed to raise ineffective crimmigration counsel as an 
affirmative defense to removal. The affirmative defense would be limited to 
cases where Padilla relief was foreclosed due to inconsistencies in the definition 
of conviction,177 or where there is no available state court relief for the various 
aforementioned reasons.178 If successful in raising the affirmative defense of 
ineffective crimmigration counsel, the noncitizen should be afforded the 
opportunity to litigate a Padilla claim before the immigration judge. 
Since the affirmative defense might not be available in cases where an 
avenue for Padilla relief remains open in state courts179—such as section 1473.7 
of the California Penal Code or a similar state procedural rule, coram nobis, or 
a more generous post-conviction relief statute—the government has an 
incentive to encourage state courts to provide Padilla relief. Federal 
immigration courts will save time and resources if Padilla claims are litigated 
on the merits in state courts. Additionally, state courts and legislatures that 
are concerned with having state criminal convictions questioned in federal 
immigration courts will be further incentivized to provide state relief.180 
Finally, both state and federal actors will be incentivized to ensure there are 
clear policies and procedures to implement Padilla in order to avoid 
ineffective crimmigration challenges altogether.181 When states provide 
effective crimmigration counsel at the outset, and keep a clear record of 
Padilla’s implementation, there will be fewer challenges in both state and 
federal immigration courts. When Padilla is effectively implemented and 
clear, efficient remedies are available in state criminal courts, all parties 
 
176 Opportunity to litigate here implies that a noncitizen had an available avenue for Padilla relief 
at some point after he or she discovered the constitutional defect. It would not be enough for the 
government to allege that state habeas or post-conviction relief was presumptively available for some 
window of time during which the noncitizen was unaware of the Padilla violation. See supra Section 
IV.B (discussing the strict custodial and temporal restrictions on state avenues for Padilla relief). 
177 See supra Section IV.B. 
178 See supra Section IV.B.  
179 See Cabral v. Holder, 632 F.3d 886, 890 (5th Cir. 2011) (holding that the BIA may decline to hold 
immigration proceedings in abeyance while a noncitizen pursues post-conviction relief in state courts). 
180 The state criminal conviction would not be undermined for state criminal purposes. The 
purpose of litigating the Padilla claim would be to decide if the conviction meets the federal statutory 
definition of conviction, and would not otherwise affect state reliance on the conviction, for example 
for the purposes of future sentence enhancement or collateral consequence. See, e.g., Griffiths v. INS, 
243 F.3d 45, 49 (1st Cir. 2001) (“While the INA compels consideration of various state criminal laws 
and procedures because it allows state convictions to form the basis for deportation, the question of 
what constitutes a ‘conviction’ sufficient to afford such a basis is a question of federal, not state, 
law.”); In re Matter of Roberts, 20 I & N Dec. 294, 301 (B.I.A. 1991) (explaining that federal 
immigration courts may look to state criminal proceedings to determine questions of federal 
immigration law, but may not undermine the conviction for state law purposes). 
181 See Junck et al., supra note 85, at 26-27 (discussing best practices for providing 
crimmigration counsel in state courts). 
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benefit: noncitizens have their rights protected, state criminal courts uphold 
the integrity of the criminal justice system, and federal immigration courts 
can rely on state convictions. 
C. Application to Inadmissibility Grounds 
The previous discussion focused primarily on deportation proceedings for 
noncitizens. Noncitizens in inadmissibility proceedings—which includes 
most undocumented immigrants—are removable not only for a conviction, 
but also for admitting to the commission of a crime: “any alien convicted of, 
or who admits having committed, or who admits committing acts which 
constitute the essential elements of” a crime involving moral turpitude or 
controlled substance offense is inadmissible.182 A guilty plea that is 
unconstitutional for lack of crimmigration counsel should also be considered 
invalid as an admission under the criminal grounds for inadmissibility. 
Over the years, the BIA has identified four requirements for a factual 
admission to trigger inadmissibility: 1) the noncitizen must admit to 
engagement in conduct that is unquestionably a specific crime in the 
jurisdiction in which it was committed; 2) the conduct must necessarily 
involve moral turpitude or a criminalized controlled substance; 3) admissions 
to government officials must be preceded by an explanation of the relevant 
crime; and 4) the admission must be made freely and voluntarily.183 
This fourth requirement, that the admission be made freely and 
voluntarily, should preclude the use of a guilty plea accepted without effective 
crimmigration counsel to establish an admission. Considering any guilty plea 
to be factual admission is, at some level, a legal fiction. There is a reason it is 
referred to as “plea bargaining” or “plea negotiation;” rather than finding the 
facts, the prosecution and defense weigh resources and likely outcomes before 
settling on a mutually agreeable compromise.184 
The questionable reliability of a guilty plea as an admission of fact is 
increased when one considers a guilty plea accepted without knowledge of the 
consequences of that plea. Along with effective assistance of counsel during 
plea bargaining, a valid plea must also be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.185 
A guilty plea accepted without knowledge of the immigration consequences is 
 
182 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i) (2012). 
183 GARCIA HERNANDEZ, supra note 10, at 26-27. 
184 Cf. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 144 (2012) (describing the plea-bargaining process as a 
mutually beneficial exchange because of “[t]he potential to conserve valuable prosecutorial resources 
and for defendants to . . . receive more favorable terms at sentencing”). 
185 See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 244 (1969) (noting the importance of ensuring that 
an accused has “a full understanding of what the plea connotes and its consequence”). 
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not a free and voluntary admission.186 The entire idea behind the prejudice 
prong of Padilla is that a noncitizen would not have admitted to commission of 
a particular crime if he or she had known the consequences, and instead would 
have either pursued a different plea bargain or proceeded to trial.187 A plea 
bargain that is unconstitutional due to inadequate counsel on immigration 
consequences is not a valid conviction, nor a voluntary and intelligent 
admission of fact.188 
D. Advantages of Litigating Padilla Claims in Federal Court 
Although the guilty plea was entered in state criminal courts, there are 
unique advantages to litigating a Padilla claim in federal immigration courts. 
Whereas state courts have expertise in litigating ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims more generally, immigration judges bring to bear expertise in 
immigration law, which is vital to applying the Strickland test in the Padilla 
context.189 Immigration judges are in a better position to decide if the 
performance of the crimmigration counsel was unreasonable, which according 
to Padilla depends partially on whether the immigration consequences were 
straight forward or complex.190 Additionally, immigration judges’ intimate 
knowledge of the harsh consequences of deportation give them insight into 
noncitizens’ decisionmaking during plea-bargaining, which is an essential 
component in determining the prejudice prong of an ineffective crimmigration 
 
186 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 385 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring) (arguing that it is “hard 
to say” that a guilty plea entered without constitutionally competent counsel “embodies a voluntary 
and intelligent decision” to forsake the right to a trial); cf. Frye, 566 U.S. at 141-42 (discussing how 
the Padilla court rejected the government’s contention that a guilty plea entered into knowingly and 
voluntarily can overcome errors by defense counsel). 
187 See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 373 (explaining that by considering immigration consequences 
during plea negotiation, “the defense and prosecution may well be able to reach agreements that 
better satisfy the interests of both parties,” including by creating pleas that avoid triggering removal 
while incentivizing noncitizens to take favorable guilty pleas). 
188 A second difference between removals for inadmissibility and deportability is the burden 
of proof. If the removal is for inadmissibility, the noncitizen has the responsibility of proving “clearly 
and beyond a doubt” that he or she is not inadmissible. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(2)(A) (2012). Because 
the noncitizen would be responsible for raising ineffective crimmigration counsel as an affirmative 
defense, however, the shifting burden of proof should not affect the procedure outlined above. The 
noncitizen would have the burden of proving that he or she was admissible because the conviction 
was constitutionally invalid due to ineffective crimmigration counsel. 
189 See Lasch, supra note 7, at 2159 (discussing the advantages of litigating Padilla claims in 
immigration courts, including that immigration courts are “the forum with the greatest incentive to 
vindicate the right,” given state courts’ concern with the finality of convictions and lack of concern 
over federal immigration consequences of state convictions). 
190 See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 368-69 (describing the variable duties of counsel based on the 
complexity and clarity of the deportation consequences); see also Lasch supra note 7, at 2159 
(suggesting that state courts are not equipped to determine whether the immigration consequences 
of a guilty plea are straightforward or complex). 
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counsel claim.191 An immigration judge is in a better position to determine both 
whether the performance of crimmigration counsel was unreasonable and how 
such advice affected the noncitizen’s decision to accept the plea. 
It is also improbable to suggest that the federal immigration courts will 
be faced with a flood of nonmeritorious Padilla claims. Because the burden 
falls on the noncitizen to prove ineffective crimmigration counsel, and 
noncitizens may be subjected to mandatory detention during removal 
proceedings, those with no viable claim that defense counsel inadequately 
advised them on immigration consequences and thus adversely affected their 
decision to plea are unlikely to raise the affirmative defense. 
CONCLUSION 
The holding of Padilla is clear: a guilty plea entered without advice on the 
immigration consequences of the conviction is a violation of the Sixth 
Amendment. It would be incongruous to suggest that a guilty plea that is 
constitutionally invalid because of the failure to advise the defendant on the 
immigration consequences of that plea could still be used to effectuate those 
very same adverse immigration consequences. Given the insufficient and 
jumbled state of Padilla remedies in the state courts, the federal courts should 
step in to ensure that noncitizens are not removed without effective assistance 
of crimmigration counsel, as guaranteed by Padilla. In doing so, the federal 
courts will encourage states to effectively implement policies upholding 
Padilla and to provide remedies in cases where crimmigration counsel was 
inadequate. Like it did in 1996 with the passage of IIRIRA, Congress may 
step in and clarify the definition of “conviction” to conform to the Padilla 
decision. However, until this occurs, there is substantial support for an 
interpretation of conviction that is consistent with Padilla’s requirement that 
noncitizens be afforded effective crimmigration counsel. 
 
191 See supra note 84 (discussing the prejudice prong post-Padilla). 
